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Abstract
This article uses a well-received recent text—Hess and McAvoy’s The Political Classroom—to suggest
that democratic citizenship education today has a social accountability problem. I locate this
discussion in the context of a longstanding conflict between the critical thinking approach to
democratic citizenship education, the approach typified by The Political Classroom, and the critical
pedagogical approach, which has an equal but opposite problem, that of indoctrination. If
democratic citizenship educators are truly interested in transforming the social order, I suggest, then
we need to listen appreciatively, and respond thoughtfully, to critiques of the approach we favor. The
article ends by outlining a possible way forward, by means of a concept I term “transformative
criticality.” I suggest that such an approach to criticality is enacted in another well-received recent
volume in the field, Stitzlein’s Teaching for Dissent.
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The balcony of the Adams High School auditorium is filled with
students, teachers, and administrators who are skipping lunch to watch
the senior class legislate. Even the local mayor is in the audience. They
are observing more than 200 seniors who are dressed in crisp shirts,
dresses, and suits and ties. On the theater floor there is a hum of
anticipation. . . . Students huddle in deep discussion; several are
clutching prepared comments as they pace near one of two microphones
standing in the aisles. Majority and minority leaders, and a bevy of
more than 20 whips, are busily directing and organizing their peers. . . .
On the stage, the Speaker of the House sits at a table reviewing the
docket with the Sergeant at Arms. The bell rings, and with a loud bang,
the speaker’s gavel signals that the session will resume. (p. 85)

This passage from Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) recent volume, The
Political Classroom: Evidence and Ethics in Democratic Citizenship,
paints a vivid, compelling picture of a legislative simulation at a
school Hess and McAvoy have called Adams High. Here, students
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deliberate controversial political issues, aiming to come to
agreements about policy alternatives. By so doing, Hess and
McAvoy argue, they learn to participate skillfully in the public
sphere, supporting their views with informed reasons and listening
generously to those with whom they disagree.
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Adams High is a case, Hess and McAvoy (2015) contend, of
“inclusive participation,” and yet a second passage from the same
chapter draws a less inclusive picture. Amanda, a high-achieving
student and one of the only Black students in her class, reported
that, in response to her objections to a proposed ban on affirmative
action, classmates told her, “We don’t want to hear your facts.” She
reported feeling that her views “were often dismissed by her
classmates” (p. 104). Despite this and other evidence that the
legislative simulation may have been less inclusive than the authors
claimed, Amanda’s experience receives less than a paragraph;
meanwhile, the paragraphs immediately following repeats the
volume’s common refrain: “Through the process of reasoning,” the
authors maintain, “perspectives are broadened” (p. 104).
I use this episode from The Political Classroom, arguably one
of the best recent works in the field, to point out that American
democratic citizenship education today has a social accountability
problem. That is, respected democratic citizenship educators—
Hess and McAvoy included—have embraced classroom
deliberation not only as “best practice,” but indeed as a cure for
what ails our democracy. In this article, I argue that democratic
citizenship educators’ faith in deliberation’s inclusive and socially
transformative potential renders them inappropriately inattentive
to the real challenges that social inequality poses to deliberative
democracy.
I locate this discussion in the contenxt of a longstanding
conflict between the critical thinking approach to democratic
education—as typified by The Political Classroom, with its social
accountability problem—and the critical pedagogical approach,
which has an equal but opposite problem, that of indoctrination. In
the latter part of the article, I propose a possible way forward,
through a concept I term “transformative criticality.” To illustrate, I
use another well-received recent volume in the field: Stitzlein’s
(2014) hopeful and pragmatic book, Teaching for Dissent.
Before proceeding, I would like to put my cards on the table: I
identify as a critical pedagogical scholar, in that I believe schools
can and should prepare young people to participate skillfully in the
struggle to bring about a more just world. Given my critical
pedagogical commitments, and critical thinking’s status as “best
practice,” this article concerns itself more with the widespread
influence of critical thinking’s social accountability problem than
with the more limited influence of critical pedagogy’s (admittedly
often real) indoctrination problem. That said, if democratic
citizenship educators truly want to transform the social order, we
must listen and respond to critiques of our favored approaches. For
me, this entails learning to read the critical thinkers generously and
engage with their perspectives in ways that lend my own critical
work greater capacity to be convincing. I hope this inquiry might
avail the critical thinkers something similar: an ability to speak in
ways that critical pedagogues like myself can hear and appreciate.

Critical Thinking: Characteristics and Limitations
Published nearly two decades ago, Burbules and Berk’s (1999)
paper distinguishing critical thinking from critical pedagogy
remains a useful tool for conceptualizing widely divergent uses of
the term “critical” in educational research today. In this and the
democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 2

next section, I draw on Burbules and Berk’s framework to outline
key characteristics of critical thinking and then of critical
pedagogy. I explore how each orientation has been taken up by
democratic citizenship educators and conclude each of the two
sections by sketching the orientation’s limitations.
Those favoring critical thinking, Burbules and Berk (1999)
explained, aim to produce young people who can make thoughtful,
well-substantiated choices about their values and behavior. The
critical thinking approach advocates giving and seeking reasons
and evidence; from this perspective, social ills arise from
“irrational, illogical, and unexamined living” (p. 46). While
proponents disagree over the extent to which critical thinking
ought to focus on morals or ideology (Johnson & Morris, 2010, p.
79), in general they eschew an ideological orientation toward
building a more just world in favor of a logical orientation toward
producing thoughtful and reasonable people. In democratic
citizenship education, I suggest, this aim elicits a pluralist
conception of who is involved, a set of strategies dependent on
political autonomy, and the cultivation of the disposition Burbules
(1995) has labeled reasonableness.
For classroom deliberation to be high-quality—for it be
effectively transformative—many citizenship educators who favor
the critical thinking approach advocate pluralism (Johnson, 2016;
Parker, 1996, 2003). They value difference and disagreement as
desirable—not as problems to be avoided or suppressed. Pluralists
view diversity “as a deliberative asset” because difference
“motivates individuals to justify their proposals with appeals to
justice” and “contributes to social knowledge” (Parker, 2003, p. 97;
see also Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In other words, diversity
allows more possibilities to be considered, and this renders justice
a necessary criterion in decision-making. Pluralism benefits
democracy, then, by preventing it from devolving into monolithic
tyranny. From this perspective, tolerance is key: To take full
advantage of the opportunities difference avails us, we must respect
others’ rights to hold views we find objectionable.
Political autonomy—the “capacity to make un-coerced
decisions” (Parker, 2014, p. 357)—is understood by critical thinking
proponents to contribute to a democracy’s well-being. From this
perspective, individuals must be free to choose the values and
beliefs to which they ascribe, neither mindlessly adhering to the
dominant view nor being forced or coerced into doing so.
Politically autonomous citizens are able to articulate their own
concepts of “the good life” (Gutmann, 1999) and to tolerate others’
views, even when these views compete with their own. Indeed, a
liberal democracy requires citizens to be tolerant, independent
critical thinkers, so schooling must aim not to indoctrinate them
but instead—somewhat paradoxically—to “shape them into the
kind of people who decide for themselves what shape they will
take” (Parker, 2014, p. 353). Political autonomy and classroom
deliberation are viewed, from this perspective, as mutually
reinforcing: Young people need opportunities to participate in
decision-making in order to develop their autonomy, and they
need to develop their own values and beliefs in order to decide.
A central disposition of the critical thinking approach to
democratic citizenship education is what Burbules (1995) has
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called reasonableness. In response to postmodern and feminist
critiques of reason and rationality—the critique, for example, that
“reason” privileges a Western, patriarchal worldview—Burbules
proposed this more modest and contingent concept. For Burbules,
reasonableness indicated “a practice growing out of communicative
interactions in which the full play of human thought, feeling, and
motivation operate” (p. 85). Whereas rationality tends to privilege
logical deduction and a search for universal truths, reasonableness,
in his view, arises from “practical, social” activities like speaking,
listening, and reflection and may not be generalizable to all people.
Reasonableness seeks an outcome to which participants, after
careful deliberation, are willing to consent.
One of the critical pedagogues’ primary critiques of critical
thinking is that it makes a false claim to ideological neutrality.
Burbules and Berk (1999) explained that, according to the critical
pedagogical view, deliberation is never neutral but rather arises
from and therefore favors a Western, patriarchal worldview
(Gaztambide-Fernández, 2012; Sanders, 1997). Burbules’s own
(1995) more contingent definition of reasonableness
notwithstanding, the critical pedagogues suggest deliberation
cannot escape an intrinsic bias in favor of certain cultural
perspectives at the expense of others. It places a Western, liberal
humanist emphasis on the individual at the expense of the
collective and masquerades as equitable while favoring dominant
identities and ideologies.
Not only is deliberation biased, from this view, but so is the
society in which we live: Through popular culture and media, and
through schooling itself, our society cultivates conventional
assumptions while suppressing other values and ways of seeing the
world. As Burbules and Berk (1999) explained, from the critical
pedagogical perspective, “indoctrination is the case already;
students must be brought to criticality, and this can only be done by
alerting them to the social conditions that have brought this about”
(p. 55). The umbrella critique—the one Burbules and Berk endorsed
as “the most challenging critique” of critical thinking—is that it
fails to attend to people’s lived experience of inequality. “Critical
Thinking needs to be questioned from the standpoint of social
accountability,” they wrote. “It needs to be asked what difference it
makes to people’s real lives” (p. 58).

Critical Pedagogy: Characteristics and Limitations
Whereas critical thinking focuses on the skillful use of reasons and
evidence, remaining relatively agnostic as to content, critical
pedagogy focuses on the hegemony of dominant ideologies and the
resulting oppression of marginalized social groups (or those whom
Spivak [1988] has termed “the subaltern”). Proponents “raise
questions about inequalities of power, about the false myths of
opportunity and merit for many students, and about the way belief
systems become internalized” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 50). Rather
than accepting the status quo, critical pedagogues hope learners and
teachers together will develop what Freire (1970/2008) termed
conscientizaçáo—often translated as “critical consciousness.” This
attitude concerns itself with “social relations, social institutions, and
social traditions that create and maintain conditions of oppression”
(Burbules and Berk, 1999, p. 53). In democratic citizenship education,
democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 2

I want to suggest, critical pedagogy is characterized by a solidarity-
based conception of who is involved, a strategy centered around
social justice activism, and a disposition to critique.
Whereas the deliberative ideal favored by critical-thinking-
oriented democratic citizenship educators values pluralism—the
idea that difference is an asset to decision-making—critical
pedagogical citizenship educators favor a broadened conception
of difference, via the notion of solidarity. This is the idea that our
differences may be balanced by our interdependence and shared
human experience. Rorty (1989) argued that we must “extend our
sense of ‘we’ to people whom we have previously thought of as
‘they’” (p. 192). For Rorty, those of us who benefit from inequality
can and should develop solidarity by attending to our common
experiences of suffering—that is, by “increasing our sensitivity to
the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other,
unfamiliar sorts of people” (p. xvi).1
Solidarity denotes a rejection or even reversal of hierarchies,
undermining existing power dynamics by positioning the
oppressed as agents and knowers, while positioning the
oppression’s beneficiaries as allies rather than saviors. Freire
(1970/2008) emphasized that a pedagogy of the oppressed must be
“forged with, not for the oppressed.” His “radical . . . is not afraid to
meet the people or enter into dialogue with them” and “does not
consider himself or herself the proprietor of history or of all people,
or the liberator of the oppressed; but . . . does commit himself or
herself, within history, to fight at their side” (p. 113). The definition
of political solidarity I use in this article echoes Freire’s emphasis on
the responsibilities of the oppressor. With their “political solidarity
model of social change,” Subašić, Reynolds, and Turner (2008) have
also advocated such a definition: According to this model, “the
majority . . . come to embrace the minority’s cause as its own”
(p. 331). Political solidarity, from this perspective, entails alliances
among actors from divergent backgrounds—the privileged and the
marginalized alike.
Whereas the critical thinking approach to democratic
citizenship education values reasonableness, with its level-headed
exchange of ideas, critical pedagogical scholars tend to favor a
disposition toward critique that may become intemperate. They
attend to inequality’s systemic nature, condemning the everyday
social processes that hold inequality in place, and advocating for
change. In contrast to the careful weighing of alternatives and
tempered civility of the deliberative classroom, critical pedagogy
maintains that emotions are intrinsic to criticality. Levine and
Nierras’s (2007) interviews with sixty activists, for example, found a
recurring emphasis on the “legitimate need to express anger, grief,
and other powerful emotions” (p. 13). And Purpel (1999), noting
1 As Rorty (1989) and Freire (1970/2008) have conceptualized it,
solidarity is undertaken by those who benefit from inequality, in concert
with those who are harmed by it. Of course, solidarity is and ought to be
undertaken among marginalized groups, independent of their relation
to the privileged (e.g., Gaztambide-Fernández, 2012; Mohanty, Russo, &
Torres, 1991). In the context of public education, however, most teachers,
administrators, and other decision-makers benefit from racial, economic,
and other forms of privilege, and this article’s definition of solidarity takes
that into account.
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that public education has “contributed to and colluded with . . .
structured inequality, rationed dignity, rationalized privilege, and
self-righteous hierarchy,” responded with “moral outrage at the
unnecessary pain and suffering” such ideologies reproduce
(pp. 188–189). For critical pedagogues, like many justice-oriented
activists today, powerful emotions are an appropriate—indeed, a
reasonable—response to inequality and injustice.
Finally, while the critical thinking approach to democratic
citizenship education values political autonomy—the idea that
young people should decide for themselves what “shape they will
take” —the critical pedagogical approach values committed social
justice activism. Here, young people learn to build and take part in
social movements and nonviolent direct action designed to
challenge an unjust status quo (e.g., Kirshner, 2015). Critical
pedagogues do not assume that deciding leads naturally to
implementation; rather, students need to be taught to translate their
political voice into political influence (Allen & Light, 2015). As
Peterson (2014) has argued, “if we envision education for
democracy as a means of developing in students a facility for
actively participating in identifying and then opposing injustices in
society, then we must move beyond teaching them to voice their
objections” (p. 6). In addition to teaching young people to exchange
reasons and agree on policies, Peterson claimed, educators must
support young people in developing skills for nonviolent action.
One of the critical thinkers’ primary concerns about critical
pedagogy, Burbules and Berk (1999) explained, is that it may entail
indoctrinating students to a particular worldview. “Teaching
students to think critically must include allowing them to come to
their own conclusions,” this perspective holds, “yet critical
pedagogy seems to come dangerously close to prejudging what
those conclusions must be” (p. 54). A thorough exploration of why
critical pedagogical approaches sometimes stray into the territory
of indoctrination is outside the scope of the article. However, I do
want to point out the approach’s general inattentiveness to practical
questions of curriculum and instruction (Deng, 2015; M. Young,
2011, 2013). In the absence of “detailed examinations of what
actually happens in schools” (Apple, 2015, p. xv)—such as those
that Hess and McAvoy and other critical thinkers have often
undertaken—teachers favoring a critical pedagogical orientation
may have few models for teaching about oppression in ways that do
not tell students what to think.
From the critical thinking perspective, then, critical
pedagogues inculcate students with leftist political values (such as
anticapitalism and opposition to globalization, working-class
solidarity, green politics, feminism and LGBTQ rights, and
multiculturalism or antiracism). Insofar as critical pedagogy views
all social relations through a lens of oppression and domination,
critical thinkers charge, “everything is up for questioning within
critical pedagogy except the categories and premises of critical
pedagogy itself ” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 56). The umbrella
critique here—what Burbules and Berk (1999) described as “the
most challenging critique”—is that critical pedagogy fails to
examine its own ironically hegemonic tendencies. “Critical
Pedagogy needs to be questioned,” they argued, regarding
democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 2

“whether it is simply a more egalitarian and humane way of
steering students toward certain foregone conclusions” (p. 58).2

Criticality at an Impasse
Despite their differences, critical thinking and critical pedagogy
share some worthy goals. Both aspire to social transformation,
as contrasted with the competing educational purpose of
“transmission” (Stanley, 1992). Those who advocate education
for transmission aim to prepare young people to participate
skillfully in society in its current form and, by so doing, to
reproduce current configurations of institutional and power
hierarchies. Although transmission-style approaches are among
the most influential in American citizenship education (see
Knight Abowitz & Harnish, 2006, on civic republicanism), both
critical thinking and critical pedagogy reject this model. Instead,
they aim to use schooling, and democratic citizenship education
specifically, to transform the social order. They share a desire to
overcome ignorance and to support young people in making
decisions based on more accurate understandings of social
reality than often hold sway in the American political sphere.
And yet, despite their transformative aspirations, Burbules
and Berk have observed, both critical thinking and critical
pedagogy have grown ironically uncritical about the most
significant limitations to their transformative capacity. Each
viewing the other as “insufficiently critical” (p. 56), both sides have
become increasingly adamant about their exclusive capacity to
transform society—whether society appears to be transforming or
not. Indeed, this ideological amplification has real consequences
for democratic citizenship education, and the type of society to
which it contributes. Critical pedagogy may be influential in the
academy, but it is rare in classrooms (Knight Abowitz & Harnish,
2006), arguably because of justifiable concerns about political
indoctrination. On the other hand, critical thinking is commonly
viewed as a “best practice” approach to democratic citizenship
education, but its limitations as far as social accountability give
cause for real concern, as Hess and McAvoy’s Political Classroom
has recently exemplified.

Democratic Citizenship Education’s
Social Accountability Problem:
Limitations of a “Best Practice” Approach
The Political Classroom, I suggest, epitomizes the critical thinking
approach to democratic citizenship education. Grounded in the
belief that “schools are, and ought to be, political sites,” the book
takes a sympathetic look at a challenging paradox for democratic
citizenship educators. Namely, schools must “provide students
with a nonpartisan political education” while also preparing them
“to participate in the actual, highly partisan political community”
(Hess & McAvoy, 2015, p. 4). To these ends, Hess and McAvoy
(2015) advocate classroom deliberation of controversial political
issues and describe the results of an ambitious mixed-method
longitudinal study of high school social studies courses featuring
such deliberation. In the three case studies their volume highlights,
2 See Hytten’s recent (2015) article in Democracy & Education for a
thoughtful response to such charges.
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students reported an increased “appreciation for the complexity of
political issues” (p. 53); a greater tendency to discuss politics
outside of class (p. 55); and an enthusiasm for “being inducted into
the world of adult discourse” (p. 58). Inasmuch as these dispositions
are rare among American youth, the authors’ claim about the
transformative potential of classroom deliberation is sound: These
are indeed “values that would make a stronger democracy” (p. 7).
The Political Classroom has been widely celebrated (American
Educational Research Association, 2016; Brighouse, 2015; Lo, 2015;
Tiflati, 2015), and this response is deserved. In contrast to many
critical pedagogical volumes on curriculum (e.g., Apple, 2004; Au,
2012), Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) book investigates day-to-day
instructional practices in real classrooms. Since the publication of
Controversy in the Classroom (2009), Hess’s work has given
classroom teachers (including me) the courage to introduce
contentious political issues into our classrooms and to open these
issues to debate. This contribution to democratic citizenship
education is invaluable. That said, I agree with Wegwert’s (2015)
recent argument that Hess and McAvoy’s book does not go far
enough. As Wegwert put it, “the strategies offered in The Political
Classroom are necessary but not sufficient” for contributing to
social transformation. My aim, in highlighting The Political
Classroom’s limitations, is not to pick on this particular volume or
its authors; in fact, I quite like the book. And yet I worry about
democratic citizenship educators’ wide agreement that the values
expressed therein constitute the best of democratic citizenship
education practice.
The critical thinking characteristics of pluralism, political
autonomy, and reasonableness are central to The Political Classroom.
In the remainder of this section, I sketch how the book expresses
these characteristics and then discuss some limitations by drawing
on Sanders’s (1997) provocative argument against deliberation. I
draw on one more student experience reported in Hess and
McAvoy’s discussion, an anecdote that illustrates the limitations
Sanders describes. The section that follows proposes an alternative
approach to citizenship education.
Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) endorsement of classroom
deliberation aligns with the pluralist perspective that difference is
an asset to deliberation, rather than an impediment. They argue
that inviting young people to deliberate authentic political
controversies increases their awareness of and appreciation for
diverse perspectives, which is surely true. However, as indicated by
their too-brief discussion of Amanda’s experience, they do not take
seriously the real challenges that social inequality poses to their
pluralist ideals. Amanda’s report that her white classmates told her
“we don’t want to hear your facts”—a report that seems to challenge
Hess and McAvoy’s claims about this school’s inclusivity—is left
almost entirely unexamined.
Similarly, their emphasis on political autonomy has much to
offer, but autonomy’s limitations remain unexplored. Consider the
cautionary example of a teacher Hess and McAvoy call Ms. Potter,
who used a simulation on wealth inequality to advocate her own
leftist perspectives on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East during
the Iraq War. The authors rightly point out that such airings of a
teacher’s opinions “communicate to students that there is one
democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 2

view—or one reasonable view—and oversimplify complex political
issues” (p. 81). In the anecdote of Ms. Potter, and throughout The
Political Classroom, the authors reiterate how such (arguably
critical pedagogical) approaches risk indoctrinating students and
can interfere with political autonomy. And yet, Hess and McAvoy
pay little attention to the cultural bias that accompanies autonomy’s
origins in Western liberal humanism or this value’s individualist
nature (see, e.g., Gaztambide-Fernández, 2012; Knight Abowitz and
Harnish, 2006). These are valid concerns that need to be taken up.
Finally, like other democratic citizenship educators and
researchers, Hess and McAvoy (2015) emphasize reasonableness.
This value appears in The Political Classroom in at least two forms.
First is in the value placed upon “reasonable views” over
unreasonable ones. For Hess and McAvoy, a view is unreasonable if
it violates democratic values such as equality or political
engagement (p. 76). Because exchanging reasons requires citizens
to talk and listen to one another respectfully, a second form of
reasonableness involves what teachers in the study labeled “civil
discourse.” The authors characterize the distinction between civil
and uncivil political talk by drawing on students’ own terminology,
contrasting a “passionate” discussion with one that might “get out
of hand” (p. 95). And while Hess and McAvoy do take pains to
emphasize disagreement’s value to deliberation, they do not
consider that some political issues might evoke intemperate
disagreements or that some people might be less likely to be
perceived as reasonable, regardless of what they say or how they say
it.
In her provocative essay “Against Deliberation,” Sanders (1997)
argued that deliberation is often counterproductive because “what
happens when American citizens talk to each other is often neither
truly deliberative nor really democratic” (p. 349). She observed that
spelling out standards of respectful discourse such as “address[ing]
each other as equals” and “offering reasonable, morally justifiable
arguments”—presumably the kinds of norms established in the
classrooms Hess and McAvoy described—provides no guarantee
that such norms will be achieved. “The careful articulation of these
formal standards,” she wrote, “is a far cry from an assessment of the
probability of meeting them” (p. 348). Moreover, when facilitators
do articulate such standards, whether in the context of a teacher
instructing a class or a judge instructing a jury, she pointed out, this
can create a false impression that the demands of respectful
discourse have been addressed, and require no further attention—
except perhaps in cases of gratuitous, and ostensibly anomalous,
violations.
Indeed, because some citizens are more likely than others to
articulate arguments in so-called rational terms, Sanders (1997)
argued, respectful and inclusive deliberation may appear to be
proceeding when it is not. In such cases,
we may . . . mistakenly decide that conditions of mutual respect have
been achieved by deliberators. In this way, taking deliberation as a
signal of democratic practice paradoxically works undemocratically,
discrediting on seemingly democratic grounds the views of those who
are less likely to present their arguments in ways that we recognize as
characteristically deliberative. (p. 349)
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Sanders went on to explain that, in our political culture, those with
less experience presenting their arguments in such ways are often
those “already underrepresented in formal political institutions
and . . . systematically materially disadvantaged”—including
women, people of color, and the poor. These people tend not only
to have less experience making arguments recognizable by others
as reasonable—“no matter how worthy or true” their
perspectives—but, because of the insidious and often invisible
dynamics of prejudice, such people are also less likely to be listened
to even when their statements conform to the conventions of
rational discourse (p. 349). Thus, for example, the often thoughtfully articulated and well-supported concerns of Black Lives
Matter activists have frequently been dismissed as irrational (Jerde,
2015), uninformed (Lu, 2015), or even racist (Mendoza, 2015).
Sanders attributed such dismissals to structural and identity-based
inequalities in what she called “epistemological authority,” or “the
capacity to evoke acknowledgement of one’s arguments” (p. 349;
see also I. M. Young, 1996).
This article began by using Amanda’s story to illustrate a
problem with Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) ostensibly-best-practice
approach to democratic citizenship education. In another,
somewhat more elaborated example from the volume, a conservative Mexican American student named Gabe reported having
overheard other Republican students saying, “Get out of here,” and,
“Go back to Mexico,” during the legislative simulation’s deliberation of an immigration bill on the House floor. He responded by
deciding to share his own experience as an immigrant with the
assembly, breaking with his own party and advocating for the
Democrats’ proposed legislation. Afterward, Gabe recalled that his
classmates “kind of quieted down and they stopped making racial
slurs . . . I was happy I had made an impact on the way they were
acting.” He explained that the simulation improved his confidence
“to stand up and say ‘this is what I see,’” and, for this reason, in Hess
and McAvoy’s view, the incident supplied a “powerful” opportunity
for Gabe to learn to speak out against racist views (p. 103). To be
sure, this was likely an important incident in the development of
Gabe’s political autonomy.
While I share Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) enthusiasm for
Gabe’s courage, and for the empowerment he felt as a result, I want
to suggest that their interpretations of Gabe’s and Amanda’s
experiences reveal limitations of the deliberative ideal—“from the
standpoint,” as Burbules and Berk (1999) put it, “of social accountability.” Deliberations over affirmative action, in Amanda’s case, and
immigration, in Gabe’s case, opened doors for dismissive and
arguably racist attitudes to be aired in the classroom, with no
evident structures in place to hold the perpetrators, their peers,
the teachers, or the curriculum accountable. These episodes
illustrate, in microcosm, one of democracy’s most persistent
problems: that is, the potential tyranny of a majority. In On
Liberty, Mill (1859/1956) conceptualized the tyranny of the
majority by arguing that, in a representative democracy, “society
can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong
mandates instead of right . . . it practices a social tyranny more
formidable than many kinds of political oppression” (p. 4).
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While it may be excessive to view the legislative simulation
that Hess and McAvoy (2015) described as “political oppression,” it
is, on the other hand, naïve to assume that reasoned deliberation in
and of itself promotes the safety of its participants. And yet the
brevity of the book’s discussion of such incidents—together they
receive about three pages in a volume of more than 200—suggests
that Hess and McAvoy view them as anomalies, rare eruptions of
disrespect in a deliberative curriculum built for, and usually
successful at achieving, inclusivity and respect. The pluralist
perspective that difference is an asset in deliberation would appear
to impede, in this case, earnest exploration of the challenges such
difference may occasion—particularly when students’ experiences
and status are not merely different, but unequal. Thus, from the
standpoint of social accountability, Hess and McAvoy’s claims
about Adams High’s inclusivity underestimate the complexity and
urgency of creating a truly inclusive classroom.
Amanda’s and Gabe’s experiences at Adams High, in my view,
bear out Sanders’s (1997) claim about the limitations of deliberation. For Amanda in particular—who was told “we don’t want to
hear your facts”—it is evident that her capacity to make arguments
heard, no matter how well-reasoned and thoughtfully-prepared,
was limited by peers’ perceptions of her epistemological authority.
Hess and McAvoy (2015) remain silent on the experiences of
students less adept at conforming to the conventions of rational
deliberation, or those who had internalized the belief that they
have no right to speak (I. M. Young, 1996). Rather, in the “best
practice discussion” classrooms they describe, students’ social
status is treated as a nonissue. The authors imply that classroom
deliberation, when well-implemented, is so inclusive as to overcome all but the most gratuitous incidents of bias and marginalization. Amanda’s and Gabe’s experiences suggest otherwise.
The Political Classroom’s widespread warm reception reflects
critical thinking’s current dominance in democratic citizenship
education. The field’s enthusiasm for classroom deliberation is
warranted, yet many citizenship educators favoring the critical
thinking approach suffer from a dismissive attitude toward the real
challenges of social inequality. Meanwhile, though critical
pedagogy offers a robust answer to problems of social accountability, Ms. Potter’s story offers an existence proof about the risks of
indoctrination. For researchers and practitioners who favor critical
thinking and prioritize political autonomy, these risks make
critical pedagogy untenable. However, in the absence of the social
accountability that critical pedagogy might supply, even the best
scholarly work in the field—which Hess and McAvoy’s (2015) book,
in my view, exemplifies—offers limited capacity for genuine social
transformation in service of building a healthier democracy and a
more just world.

Toward a Transformative Criticality
for Democratic Citizenship Education
Burbules and Berk (1999) proposed that educational scholars
interested in rehabilitating criticality must acknowledge the
limitations of our favored approach, attending generously to what
other approaches might avail us. They called for an “alternate
criticality” that embraces the tensions between critical thinking
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and critical pedagogy, thereby allowing us to “think in new ways”
(pp. 59-60). In the balance of this article, I take up Burbules and
Berk’s call for a different approach to criticality—a criticality that
accepts the limitations of each approach, makes generative use of
the tensions between them, and thereby allows us to think
differently about what transformative schooling requires. I end by
recommending, as a possible exemplar of this alternative approach,
Stitzlein’s (2014) volume Teaching for Dissent: Citizenship Education
and Political Activism.
In response to Burbules and Berk’s (1999) call for an alternate
version of what it means to be critical, I would like to propose the
term transformative criticality. This term acknowledges both
approaches’ shared transformational aspirations and takes up
Burbules and Berk’s recommendation that we cultivate acceptance
of the limitations of our favored approach and attend with an open
mind to the resources other approaches offer. I undertake this work
in a conciliatory and pragmatist spirit akin to Dewey’s (1902), as
exemplified in his essay The Child and the Curriculum. Introducing
his distinction between the supposed unity and spontaneity of the
child, and the ostensibly stable and orderly logic of the curriculum,
Dewey observed:
Easier than thinking with surrender of already formed ideas and
detachment from facts already learned is just to stick by what is
already said, looking about for something with which to buttress it
against attack. Thus sects arise: schools of opinion. Each selects that set
of conditions that appeals to it; and then erects them into a complete
and independent truth, instead of treating them as a factor in a
problem, needing adjustment. (p. 182)

The concept of transformative criticality I articulate aims to follow
Dewey’s example: It treats the competing characteristics of critical
thinking and critical pedagogy as factors in need of adjustment, in
order more effectively to address the problem of schooling for
social transformation.
In democratic citizenship education, a transformative
criticality acknowledges the damage social inequality inflicts on the
deliberative ideal and supports young people in drawing informed
conclusions about how social problems—perhaps most important,
inequality itself—ought to be addressed. This section proposes

some key characteristics of a transformative criticality for
democratic citizenship education. These include Apple’s (2014)
concept of decentered unities as a way of conceptualizing who is
involved; a strategy that answers Westheimer and Kahne’s (2004)
call for both participatory and justice-oriented citizenship education;
and a few thoughts of my own, inspired by a pragmatist
philosophical tradition, regarding cultivating a disposition of
wholeheartedness in democratic citizenship education.
Despite his well-known critical pedagogical allegiances, Apple
crossed the aisle, as it were, to publish The Political Classroom in the
Critical Social Thought series he edits for Routledge. His notion of
“decentered unities” draws on both the critical thinkers’ pluralist
values, and the critical pedagogues’ emphasis on solidarity.
Decentered unities, Apple (2014) has explained, are areas of
“common ground” among diverse groups, whereby “joint struggles
can be engaged in ways that do not subsume each group under the
leadership of only one understanding” (p. 13). Such coalitions share
critical thinkers’ emphasis on difference, and critical pedagogues’
emphasis on solidarity. As Apple put it, “a richer and more diverse
‘we’ can be built based not on false and romantic notions that we
can all share in each other’s pain, but on a recognition that alliances
when possible are crucial to strategies of interruption” (p. 94).
Embracing decentered unities may encourage us to appeal more
widely to others, including to those who may not appear to be
natural allies (for example, consider the so-called Cowboy and
Indian Alliance, whereby indigenous groups and nonindigenous
ranchers banded together to oppose the Keystone XL pipeline).
With practical emphasis on building coalitions to interrupt
problematic social phenomena—and without necessarily specifying what kind of phenomena ought to be interrupted—decentered
unities are useful in developing a transformative approach to
criticality.
In their influential empirical study of citizenship education
programs in the United States, Westheimer and Kahne (2004)
identified three common approaches. The first, “personally
responsible citizenship,” emphasizes volunteerism and obedience
and enacts a model of social transmission rather than social
transformation. The authors rejected this model due to its message
that “citizenship does not require democratic governments,
politics, or even collective endeavors” (p. 244). Two other models,

Table 1. Three Approaches to Criticality
Critical Thinking

Critical Pedagogy

Transformative Criticality

Actors

Pluralism: individual and group
difference as an asset to deliberation

Political Solidarity: the majority
embrace the minority’s cause

“Decentered Unities”: areas of
common ground not reducible
to one understanding

Strategies

Political Autonomy: cultivating
individual capacity to make un-
coerced decisions

Social Justice Activism: cultivating
collective capacity to build and take
part in social movements

Participatory + Justice-Oriented
Citizenship: cultivating both engagement and dissent

Dispositions

Reasonableness: civilly seeking an
outcome to which deliberators are
willing to consent

Critique: cultivating attitudes of
urgency and outrage in the face of
oppression

Wholeheartedness: acknowledging
suffering and cultivating pragmatic
hopefulness

democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 2
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however, were described more favorably. “Participatory citizenship” emphasizes training students to engage with government and
community organizations and to “develop strategies for accomplishing collective tasks,” while “justice-oriented citizenship”
teaches young people to “question, debate, and change established
systems and structures that reproduce patterns of injustice over
time” (p. 240). If educators aim to support students in developing
capacities “for critical analysis and social change” as well as
“committed civic act[ion]” (p. 245), Westheimer and Kahne
argued, they must “give explicit attention to both.” I propose that
models of democratic citizenship education emphasizing both
collective action and deliberation might increase the discipline’s
capacity to contribute to social transformation. The increasingly
popular method of action civics (Gingold, 2013; Levinson, 2012;
Millenson, Mills, & Andes, 2014) is a promising example.3
Finally, I want to propose the concept of wholeheartedness as a
possible characteristic of transformative criticality for democratic
citizenship education. Where the critical thinkers tend to favor
reasonableness, with its emphasis on the dispassionate cultivation
of liberal democratic values, and the critical pedagogues tend to
favor critique, with its emphasis on the fervent communication of
moral urgency, a transformative criticality attends wholeheartedly
to the possibility that some contexts call for level-headedness and
measured deliberation, while others require impassioned outcry.
Wholeheartedness arises from humans’ essential impulse to
care—to live, as Purpel (1989) has put it, “a coherent life of ultimate
meaning . . . that is right, just, and loving” (p. 30). It does not shy
away from the difficult but rather attends with courage and
compassion to the brute realities of pain, suffering, and injustice in
the world, and cultivates commitment to addressing them.
Wholeheartedness acknowledges and contends with grief, outrage,
and despair, but also cultivates habits of pragmatic hope, which in
turn allow agency to develop (Shade, 2001). And wholeheartedness
engages thoughtfully, deliberately, and in good faith with the
available evidence, listening generously to those perspectives that
contradict our own views.
The term “wholeheartedness” may resonate with readers
familiar with Dewey’s (1916/2008) three attitudes necessary for
reflective thinking: open-mindedness, responsibility, and
wholeheartedness.4 My proposed use here expands upon Dewey’s
conception. For Dewey, wholeheartedness—or what he later
termed “simple-mindedness” or “directness”—indicated a unity of
3 As Levinson (2014) explained, action civics engages students in
examining their community, choosing a pressing issue, researching the
issue and setting a goal, analyzing power dynamics in the situation,
developing strategies for addressing the problem, and taking action to
address policy (p. 68). Action civics has great potential to support young
people in learning to translate voice into influence, and thus to contribute to transforming the social order.
4 Tracking the concept of wholeheartedness through Dewey’s work
presents a challenge, since he changed the label he applied to this concept between the 1910 edition of How We Think and a later discussion of
reflective thinking in 1916’s Democracy and Education, then dropped the
concept completely from the 1933 edition of How We Think. In tracing
this evolution, I am indebted to Rodgers (2002) for a useful bibliographic
footnote (p. 865, n. 4).
democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 2

attention and purpose and the absence of distraction or half-
hearted commitments. “Absorption, engrossment, full concern
with subject matter for its own sake, nurture it,” he wrote.
“Divided interest and evasion destroy it” (p. 183). While my own
approach to wholeheartedness does require fullness of intellectual
commitment, I am more interested in the “heart” portion of the
term than Dewey seems to have been. Wholeheartedness, as I use
it, calls for caring, in two senses of the word. That is, wholeheartedness entails caring as compassionate interdependence, in the
sense that we take care of one another (Hytten, 2015; Noddings,
2002); and it entails caring as unwavering commitment, in the
sense that we care deeply about the outcomes of our efforts toward
social transformation. When exercising caring, then, we reject
classroom approaches that harm any persons whatsoever, as well
as any approaches that pay lip service to social transformation
while reproducing the status quo.
I want to acknowledge that each of these three proposed
characteristics of a transformative criticality is challenging to
implement. In a profession beset by ever-accumulating and often
contradictory demands, a democratic citizenship education that
engages diverse groups in a joint struggle for social transformation,
supports young people in engaging in deliberation and collective
action, and cultivates a wholehearted engagement with the
uplifting and the difficult alike is an enormous undertaking. “We
must remember why it is so difficult” to make moral commitments,
Purpel (1999) has reminded us. “We must have compassion for
each other and accept as part of our assumption that the matter of
making such commitments is of great significance to each of us and
that it is very likely that many of us have struggled mightily with
this issue” (p. 58). Democratic citizenship educators interested in
increasing our capacity to contribute to social transformation
ought to hold ourselves accountable to this goal, but we need also
to have compassion for ourselves on the path.

Teaching for Dissent: An Exemplar
of Transformative Criticality
Stitzlein’s (2014) Teaching for Dissent favors neither exclusively
the critical thinking approach (with its inattention to social
inequality) nor the critical pedagogical approach (with its risk of
political indoctrination). Rather, I argue that Stitzlein’s book
expresses all three characteristics of transformative criticality,
drawing from the best of both critical thinking and critical
pedagogy without taking sides. Teaching for Dissent, Stitzlein
explains from the outset, is grounded in the idea that “good
dissent is key to the maintenance and improvement of democracy,” because dissent enables divergent voices to be heard and
contributes to the legitimacy of the government. She calls
attention to a recent upsurge in dissent in contemporary America, from the Occupy Movement to the Tea Party, representing
polarization not as a problem but as evidence of dissent’s potential to transform society. Thus, she suggests that we aim to
“maximize this historic moment of dissent in our streets” (p. 3) in
service of building a democracy “where competing visions of
good living are exchanged” (p. 8). To contribute to this
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transformative aim, she argues, schools should support young
people in developing the skills and dispositions necessary for
dissent.
Teaching for Dissent enacts a version of transformative
criticality in that it endorses both critical thinking and critical
pedagogical perspectives while sidestepping the pitfalls of both.
That is, it attends in an engaged and elaborated way to the
challenges of social inequality, while refraining from steering
readers toward predetermined conclusions. Along the way, the
volume expresses (to varying extents) the concept of “decentered
unities” as a way of conceptualizing who is involved; a strategy both
participatory and justice-oriented; and a disposition toward
wholeheartedness. Thus, its approach to democratic citizenship
education may contain greater potential to contribute to
transforming the social order than do the critical thinkers’ or
critical pedagogues’ approaches in isolation.
Of the three characteristics of a transformative criticality I
have proposed, cultivating decentered unities is least developed in
Teaching for Dissent. That said, the volume does express faith in
diverse groups’ potential to find common ground. Stitzlein’s (2014)
emphasis on “dissent within the process of consensus-building”
(p. 12) resembles the pluralists’ belief in difference as an asset to
deliberation more than it resembles Apple’s (2014) argument that
“alliances when possible are crucial to strategies of interruption”
(p. 94). On the other hand, a lengthy bipartisan appeal in the
opening pages demonstrates sincere belief in the value of coalition
building among unlikely allies. Arguing that “issues of dissent are
central to both parties . . . within the larger picture of a successfully
flourishing democracy” (p. 3), Stitzlein suggests that liberals and
conservatives alike aim to interrupt the status quo: Despite
aspirations to conserve the past, Stitzlein points out, the Right—
like the Left—uses dissent to propose new alternatives. And both
parties assert “deep commitments to individual liberties,” albeit
for different ends. To the extent that dissent “marries the best of
both parties and is feasible in today’s world” without specifying
specific political or ideological aims (Stitzlein, 2014, p. 4), it offers
an opportunity to build what Apple (2014) has called “a richer and
more diverse ‘we’” (p. 94).
Teaching for Dissent endorses both participatory and justice-
oriented approaches to citizenship education. Westheimer and
Kahne’s (2004) “participatory citizenship,” recall, emphasized
training students to engage with government and community
organizations and to “develop strategies for accomplishing
collective tasks,” while “justice-oriented citizenship” teaches young
people to “question, debate, and change established systems and
structures that reproduce patterns of injustice over time” (p. 240).
Democratic citizenship educators interested in social
transformation, they argued, must engage young people in both
approaches. Stitzlein (2014) advocates such a model when she urges
educators to provide opportunities for young people to “bring
children out to politically and civically active groups,” and to work
“alongside real people engaged in struggle, doing what Giroux
called ‘making the political more pedagogical’” (p. 176). Insofar as it
emphasizes “struggle,” this approach is more than participatory,
and insofar as it prioritizes engaging in authentic political
democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 2

decision-making processes, it exceeds the characteristics of
justice-oriented citizenship as Westheimer and Kahne described it.
For Stitzlein, young people must learn both how to exercise voice in
political institutions, and how to dissent against them when
necessary.
Of the three characteristics of transformative criticality I have
proposed, wholeheartedness is Teaching for Dissent’s clear strong
suit. Wholeheartedness, I have suggested, entails ability to
distinguish between situations that call for measured deliberation,
and situations that call for impassioned response. In keeping with
this approach, Stitzlein (2014) calls attention to the place in dissent
for both “rational argument and rhetoric” and “emotions and
embodied experience.” Reasoned deliberation and the inclusion of
multiple perspectives are essential to dissent, Stitzlein argues,
endorsing the pluralist viewpoint that “we need to celebrate and
legitimize conflict and disagreement not just as facts of life, but
sources of better living” (p. 72). At the same time, “other techniques
of dissent” are equally necessary. These may include the expression of
powerful emotions such as frustration and anger, which have the
capacity to “alert dissenters to problems” and “mobilize comrades
and persuade opponents” (p. 61). These may also include the
intemperate strategies of “mobilization, protest, and disruption”
and may “require [the] remedial work” of securing access for
oppressed peoples before deliberation can take place (pp. 73–74,
quoting Levine & Nierras, 2007, p. 36).
As these strategies may suggest, wholeheartedness in
democratic citizenship education does not avoid the difficult, but
rather attends with courage and compassion to pain, suffering, and
injustice and cultivates commitment to addressing them. In
Teaching for Dissent, these qualities of wholeheartedness arise in
Stitzlein’s (2014) discussions of despair and of hope. In a rare move
for democratic citizenship educators favoring either the critical
thinking or critical pedagogical approach, Stitzlein argues that
students “should discuss the impact of despair.” They should turn
toward and acknowledge their own and others’ suffering “and
brainstorm ways to persist through it . . . It is important that
children recognize their own closeness to, participation in, or
complicity with atrocity and despair in order to move from passive
listener . . . to active agent,” Stitzlein argues (p. 163). But she does not
stop at the despair that sometimes characterizes critical pedagogical critique. Instead, she advocates cultivating hope among
dissenters.
In her chapter on hope (coauthored with Nolan), Stitzlein
(2014) argues that good dissenters must cultivate a disposition of
hopefulness that “is located within and grows out of the muddle
and complex circumstances of everyday life” (p. 150). This pragmatist conception of hope is not starry-eyed or unrealistic, but rather
“resides in a world that is both horrendous and joyful” (p. 152).
Amidst messy and often difficult realities, young dissenters learn
neither to give up in despair nor to take refuge in fantasies and
delusions. Instead, they learn to practice the clear-eyed posing of
alternatives. Good dissent, then, marshals a “language of possibility,” in which “hope becomes anticipatory rather than messianic,
mobilizing rather than therapeutic’” (p. 148, quoting Giroux, 2006,
p. 37). Such a wholehearted approach to democratic citizenship
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calls for enormous courage and resourcefulness, from teachers and
students alike. Stitzlein makes clear that teaching for dissent
requires nothing less.
With its faith in dissent to engender decentered unities across
partisan lines, its endorsement of a simultaneously participatory
and justice-oriented democratic citizenship curriculum, and its
wholehearted and pragmatic hopefulness, Teaching for Dissent
offers democratic citizenship educators a useful model of what
transformative criticality might look like. Stitzlein takes seriously
both the critical pedagogues’ call to social accountability and the
critical thinkers’ call to allow citizens to determine for themselves
what a just and equitable society consists of. By so doing, she
models an approach to criticality which offers democratic
citizenship education an enlarged capacity to contribute to social
transformation.

Conclusion
Because of the two approaches’ unwillingness to accept their own
limitations, I have argued that neither critical pedagogy nor critical
thinking is presently in a good position to contribute to democratic
citizenship education’s efforts to transform the social order. Rather
than fortifying their positions, I suggest, each side would do well to
listen generously to rivals’ critiques. This does not mean that we
ought to abandon our loyalties, however. At the outset of this
article, I revealed my own critical pedagogical affinity, and despite
its limitations, in my view, critical pedagogy’s transformative
possibilities outweigh its shortcomings. That said, I take seriously
Burbules and Berk’s (1999) charge that scholars of all stripes ought
to attend and respond to the most difficult challenges to our points
of view.
By suggesting the term transformative criticality and
proposing some defining characteristics in the form of decentered
unities, participatory and justice-oriented citizenship, and
wholeheartedness, I gesture to a possible path out of the the
impasse Burbules and Berk (1999) described. By so doing, I hope to
avail critical pedagogical scholars like myself, and critical thinkers
too, of a set of criteria for enlarging our work’s transformative
capacities.

References
American Educational Research Association (15 March, 2016). AERA announces 2016
award winners in education research [Press release]. Retrieved from www.aera.net.
Allen, D., & Light, J. (2015). From voice to influence: Understanding citizenship in a digital
age. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Apple, M. W. (2004). Ideology and curriculum (3rd ed.). New York, NY: RoutledgeFalmer.
Apple, M. W. (2014). Can education change society? New York: Routledge.
Apple, M. W. (2015). Series editor introduction. In D. Hess & P. McAvoy, The political
classroom: Evidence and ethics in democratic education (pp. xiii–xvi). New York,
NY: Routledge.
Au, W. (2012). Critical curriculum studies: Education, consciousness, and the politics of
knowing. New York, NY: Routledge.
Brighouse, H. (2015, August 11). The political classroom. [Web log post]. Retrieved from
crookedtimber.org/2015/8/11/the-political-classroom.

democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 2

Burbules, N. C. (1995). Reasonable doubt: Toward a postmodern defense of reason as an
educational aim. In W. Kohli (Ed.), Critical conversations in philosophy of education
(pp. 82–102). New York, NY: Routledge.
Burbules, N. C., & Berk, R. (1999). Critical thinking and critical pedagogy: Relations,
differences, and limits. In T. S. Popekewitz & L. Fendler (Eds.), Critical theories in
education: Changing terrains of knowledge and politics (pp. 45–65). New York, NY:
Routledge.
Deng, Z. (2015). Organization and the sequencing of subject matters. In M. F. He,
B. D. Schultz, & W. H. Schubert (Eds.), The SAGE guide to curriculum in education
(pp. 78–86). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Reference.
Dewey, J. (1990). The child and the curriculum. In P. W. Jackson (Ed.), The school and
society and The child and the curriculum (pp. 181–209). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. (Original work published 1902)
Dewey, J. (2008). Democracy and education: The middle works of John Dewey, vol. 9:
1899–1924. J. A. Boydston (Ed). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
(Original work published 1916)
Freire, P. (2008). Pedagogy of the oppressed. M. B. Ramos, (Trans.). New York, NY:
Continuum. (Original work published 1970)
Gaztambide-Fernández, R. (2012). Decolonization and the pedagogy of solidarity.
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1), 41–67.
Gingold, J. (2013). Building on evidence-based practice of action civics: The current state of
assessments and recommendations for the future (CIRCLE working paper No. 78).
Retrieved from the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and
Engagement (CIRCLE) website: http://civicyouth.org.
Giroux, H. (2006). America on the edge. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
Gutmann, A. (1999). Democratic education (rev. ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. (1996). Democracy and disagreement. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Hess, D. A. (2009). Controversy in the classroom: The democratic power of discussion.
New York, NY: Routledge.
Hess, D. A., & McAvoy, P. (2015). The political classroom: Evidence and ethics in democratic
education. New York, NY: Routledge.
Hytten, K. (2015). Ethics in teaching for democracy and social justice. Democracy &
Education, 23(2), 1–10.
Jerde, S. (2015, July 31). Bill O’Reilly calls Black Lives Matter founder “a loon.” Talking
Points Memo. Retrieved from talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/bill-oreilly-black
-lives-matter-loons
Johnson, M. E. (2016). Emancipatory and pluralist perspectives on democracy and
economic inequality in social studies and citizenship education. In C. Wright-
Maley & T. Davis (Eds.), Teaching for democracy in an age of economic disparity
(pp. 42-58). New York, NY: Routledge.
Johnson, L., & Morris, P. (2010). Towards a framework for critical citizenship education.
The Curriculum Journal, 21(1), 77–96.
Kirshner, B. (2015). Youth activism in an era of education inequality. New York: New York
University Press.
Knight Abowitz, K., & Harnish, J. (2006). Contemporary discourses of citizenship.
Review of Educational Research, 76(4), 653–690.
Levine, P., & Nierras, R. M. (2007). Activists’ views of deliberation. Journal of Public
Deliberation, 3(1), 1–14.
Levinson, M. (2012). No citizen left behind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Levinson, M. (2014). Action civics in the classroom. Social Education, 78(2), 68–70.
Lo, J. (2015). Making impactful professional judgments in the political classroom. Theory
& Research in Social Education, 43(4), 577–581.
Lu, R. (2015, August 19). Why Black Lives Matter isn’t going to fix our problems. The
Federalist. Retrieved from www.thefederalist.com/2015/08/19/why-black-lives
-matter-isnt-going-to-fix-our-problems/

feature article

10

Mendoza, J. (2015, September 13). Can Black Lives Matter and Police Lives Matter coexist?
Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved from www.csmonitor.com/USA/USA-Update/
2015/0913/Can-Black-Lives-Matter-and-Police-Lives-Matter-coexist-video
Mill, J. S. (1956). On liberty. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. (Original work published 1859)
Millenson, D., Mills, M., & Andes, S. (2014). Making civics relevant, making citizens
effective: Action civics in the classroom. New York, NY: International Debate
Education Association.
Mohanty, C. T., Russo, A., & Torres, L., Eds. (1991). Third world women and the politics of
feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Noddings, N. (2002). Educating moral people: A caring alternative to character education.
New York, NY: Teachers College Press.

Sanders, L. M. (1997). Against deliberation. Political Theory, 25(3), 347–376.
Shade, P. (2001). Habits of hope: A pragmatic theory. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University
Press.
Spivak, G. G. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.),
Marxism and the interpretation of culture (pp. 271–313). Urbana: University of
Illinois Press.
Stanley, W. B. (1992). Curriculum for utopia: Social reconstructionism and critical pedagogy
in the postmodern era. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Stitzlein, S. M. (2014). Teaching for dissent: Citizenship education and political activism.
Boulder, CO: Paradigm.

Peterson, B. A. (2014). Nonviolent action as a necessary component in educating for
democracy. Democracy & Education, 22(1), 1–7.

Subašić, E., Reynolds, K. J., & Turner, J. C. (2008). The political solidarity model of social
change: Dynamics of self-categorization in intergroup power relations. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 12(4), 330–352.

Parker, W. C. (1996). “Advanced” ideas about democracy: Toward a pluralist conception of
citizenship education. Teachers College Record, 98, 104–125.

Tiflati, H. (2015). Review of The political classroom: Evidence and ethics in democratic
education, by D. E. Hess & P. McAvoy. Educational Studies, 51(6), 528–531.

Parker, W. C. (2003). Teaching democracy: Unity and diversity in public life. New York, NY:
Teachers College Press.

Wegwert, J. C. (2015). Necessary but not sufficient: Deweyan dialogue and the demands of
critical citizenship. A book review of The political classroom: Evidence and ethics in
democratic citizenship. Democracy & Education, 23(2), 1–3.

Parker, W. C. (2014). Citizenship education in the United States: Regime type, foundational
questions, and classroom practice. In L. P. Nucci, D. Narvaez, & T. Krettenauer (Eds.),
The Handbook of Moral and Character Education (2nd ed., pp. 347–367). New York,
NY: Routledge.
Purpel, D. E. (1989). The moral and spiritual crisis in education: A curriculum for justice
and compassion in education. New York, NY: Bergin & Garvey.
Purpel, D. E. (1999). Moral outrage in education. New York, NY: Peter Lang.
Rodgers, C. (2002). Defining reflection: Another look at John Dewey and reflective
thinking. Teachers College Record, 104(4), 842–866.
Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, solidarity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.

democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 2

Westheimer, J., & Kahne, J. (2004). What kind of citizen? The politics of educating for
democracy. American Educational Research Journal, 41(2), 237–269.
Young, I. M. (1996). Communication and the other: Beyond deliberative democracy.
In S. Benhabib (Ed.) Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the
political (pp. 120–136). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Young, M. (2011). Curriculum policies for a knowledge society? In L. Yates & M. Grumet
(Eds.), Curriculum in today’s world: Configuring knowledge, identities, work, and
politics (pp. 125–138). New York, NY: Routledge.
Young, M. (2013). Overcoming the crisis in curriculum theory: A knowledge-based
approach. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 45(2), 101–118.

feature article

11

